Legal Guadians\u27 Authority to Consent to Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders by Best, Robert J.
Marquette Elder's Advisor
Volume 1
Issue 2 Fall Article 5
Legal Guadians' Authority to Consent to Do-Not-
Resuscitate Orders
Robert J. Best
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/elders
Part of the Elder Law Commons
This Featured Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Marquette Elder's Advisor by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation




to Consent to Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders
With longer life spans comes the con-
cern of maintaining medically compro-
mised people indefinitely, with a ques-
tionable quality of life. Hard questions
need to be asked: When should older,
frailer people be resuscitated? Who
should determine when not to resusci-
tate, and how? This article examines
the legal, ethical, and social ramifica-
tions of our professional and personal
choices.
By Robert J. Best
RobertJ. Best is the Executive Director of
Westmoreland Health Center in Waukesha, Wisconsin.
Mr. Best, a licensed nursing home administrator since
1985, has worked with older adults in skilled nursing
facilities, retirement communities, and assisted living
centers for almost two decades. He co-authored I'll
Never Forget Our Home, a book designed to help
seniors adjust to the trauma of leaving the family
home.
T his article will examine do-not-resusci-tate (DNR) orders as applied to theolder adult population. We will look at
recent statutory and case law related to
the authority of surrogate decision
makers, particularly guardians, with regard to
withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation from
an older person who is not able to give informed
consent. From this background, we will offer a
framework in which guardians can make this deter-
mination consistent with current legal, ethical, and
social considerations.
Background
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been
given to the topic of life-sustaining treatment.
Three significant developments in the delivery of
health care have contributed to this heightened
awareness: (1) the increase in the number and types
of life-sustaining technologies, (2) changing percep-
tions of the role of the patient in treatment deci-
sions, and (3) an expanded view of the responsibil-
ities of health care facilities.' In addition, the
advances in medical technology and health prac-
tices have contributed to longer life spans and a
resultant dramatic increase in the number of people
over 65 years of age, particularly in the over-85 age
group. It sometimes seems that very frail, medical-
ly compromised persons can be maintained indefi-
nitely, with a questionable quality of life. Many
people, professionals and lay people alike, have
begun to question when the use of life-sustaining
treatment is appropriate and who should make that
decision.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is unique
among life-sustaining technologies. In order to be
effective, it requires rapid initiation. Consequently,
9
Eler's Advisor
there is no time to discuss treatment options with
the patient, responsible parties, or the professional
team. The introduction of mouth-to-mouth ventila-
tion and external cardiac massage in the late 1950s
revolutionized the provision of emergency care in
instances of sudden death.2 Health care facilities
adapted and developed elaborate procedures and
equipment to enable this new emergency medical
technique. Organizations like the American Heart
Association and the American Red Cross initiated
efforts to mobilize citizens to learn and provide
CPR. The overwhelming support for this form of
life support, and the unique urgency mentioned
above, led to a National Conference proposal that
CPR be initiated without a formal order from the
attending physician.' This presumption in favor of
CPR became widely accepted. CPR has been very
effective, in many cases, in maintaining life after a
sudden-death incident and enabling individuals to
return to their previous lifestyle. Without CPR,
many of these people would have died prematurely.
Should CPR be administered to every patient
who experiences cessation of heartbeat, breathing,
or both? Mark Siegler provides strong commentary
on this point: "This approach-equal CPR for all
regardless of medical condition or patient prefer-
ence-is indefensible, counterintuitive, and unethi-
cal, and would signal the ultimate transformation
of medicine from an art based upon clinical discre-
tion into an unthinking, unfeeling bureaucratic sys-
tem."4
CPR was originally intended as a means to
resuscitate otherwise healthy people whose heart-
beat and/or breathing had failed.' But, as noted
above, the presumption in favor of CPR has been,
to some extent, viewed as a universal principle.
Only more recently have certain questions begun to
arise about CPR, particularly as it relates to a frail
elderly population. A study of the outcomes of
CPR initiated on persons over 65 was conducted
by the Department of Medicine at Johns Hopkins
University. The study reviewed outcomes for both
residents and nonresidents of nursing homes.
According to the authors:
This study demonstrates that for patients in whom
CPR was initiated in a nursing home, the benefits were
extremely limited. Of 115 patients undergoing CPR,
102 were pronounced dead in the emergency room
and two more died within 24 hours of admission to
the hospital. Nine were admitted for an average stay
of five days before dying at the hospital.. . . [T~wo res-
idents returned to the nursing home: one for two
weeks and one, in a very debilitated state, for eight
months.6
The study found better outcomes for older people
who were not residents of nursing homes (and pre-
sumably less frail and perhaps somewhat younger).
Nevertheless, it raises significant questions about
the benefits of CPR for older people.
Who Should Decide?
While it is clear that CPR can be beneficial for
many people, it is also clear that in some instances
it only serves to prolong dying and perhaps suffer-
ing. As suggested above, the presumption in favor
of CPR made standing orders for CPR a general
rule in health care facilities and in emergency med-
ical response. Consequently, it became necessary to
develop do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders for
patients who are not to receive CPR. Again,
because of the urgency of CPR treatment, these
orders must be provided in advance of the need for
treatment. But who should decide whether or not
CPR should be performed? The consensus paper of
the 1974 National Conference on Cardio-
pulmonary Resuscitation indicates that "the physi-
cian has an obligation to initiate CPR in any situa-
tion where it is medically indicated." The paper
goes on to say that in the absence of medical indi-
cations, the physician should judiciously see that
CPR is not given.' This statement seems to give a
great deal of authority to the physician. It would
seem that the physician is most qualified and in the
best position to make a determination of the effica-
cy of CPR for a particular patient. However, this
view of medically indicated CPR does not give ref-
erence to patients' preferences. There is a great deal
of evidence to indicate that physicians frequently
make critical life-support decisions, particularly
those relating to resuscitation, without adequate
participation from patients.'
The paternalistic view of medicine suggests that
patients lack the knowledge and expertise to make
sound decisions regarding CPR. At the same time,
the patient's right to refuse medical care, such as
CPR, is widely acknowledged.' In his comparison of
the In re Quinlan and Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz cases, George Annas states: "Both courts
enunciate a constitutional right to refuse life-sustain-
ing treatment, based on the right to privacy."10 The
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implementation of the Patient Self-Determination
Act in 1991 seemed to strengthen the case for the
right of patients to decide for themselves.
It is possible to reconcile the decision-making
authority of the patient and physician. As Mark
Seigler puts it: "It is the physician's responsibility to
decide which patients can possibly be treated with
which medical techniques, and it is the joint respon-
sibility of the physician and the patient to decide
which should be so treated."" He continues by
offering two "ethical grounds" for making a deci-
sion not to resuscitate a patient: (1) based on sound
medical judgment that the patient's death from pri-
mary disease is imminent and that further treatment
for the primary disease is futile, or (2) following the
stated preference of an "autonomous, self-deter-
mining, competent adult."12
There seems to be strong ethical, legal, and soci-
etal support for the idea that a competent adult, in
consultation with his or her physician, has the right
to decide to withhold CPR.
Patients Without the Capacity to Make
Health Care Decisions
The issue of DNR orders becomes significantly
more complicated when applied to persons who are
incompetent or incapacitated. The capacity to
make informed decisions is a critical and disputed
concept with regard to planning for the elective use
of life-sustaining treatment." According to
Wisconsin statutes,
"Incompetent" means a person adjudged by a court of
record to be substantially incapable of managing his
or her property or caring for himself or herself by rea-
son of infirmities of aging, developmental disabilities,
or other like incapacities."
"Incapacity" means the inability to receive and evalu-
ate information effectively or to communicate deci-
sions to such an extent that the individual lacks the
capacity to manage his or her health care decisions."
When people are incompetent or incapacitated,
do they forfeit the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment? Citing the decision of the courts with
regard to Quinlan and Saikewicz, George Annas
suggests that they do not: "Incompetents should be
afforded the opportunity to exercise this right [to
refuse life-sustaining treatment]."'" But how does
one exercise this right when he or she lacks compe-
tence and/or capacity?
In the recent past, the decision was often made
by the physician. Physicians frequently take it upon
themselves to be surrogate decision makers for
incompetent patients, even when family members
are available and qualified to play that role.17 One
physician argues that when an incompetent patient
has not already expressed his wishes, the physician
should assume the responsibility for the decision
and then explain to family members why resuscita-
tion will not be attempted, rather than to ask them
whether or not it should be attempted."
This idea is contrary to the concept of patient
self-determination. An alternative would be to seek
the advice of family members and close friends.
Input from family and significant others may be
ethically important for two reasons:
First, they may (but not necessarily) reflect the per-
sonal preferences of the patient who is unable to
express them. Second, the common practice of turning
to family members acknowledges that we exist in com-
munities of concern and that those who care most
about us ought to have a special moral authority to
assist in making decisions about us when we are no
longer able to do so for ourselves."
Ethical issues notwithstanding, "family mem-
bers [and friends] have no legal authority to make
decisions on behalf of patients unable to make deci-
sions for themselves, unless they have been granted
such powers by a judge or a legislative statute."2 0
For this reason, health care professionals are
increasingly expected to look to legally authorized
surrogate decision makers, namely the holders of
powers of attorney for health care or legal
guardians. Most health care facility protocols
require the use of legally appointed surrogates for
decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment, espe-
cially when family members are not available or are
divided about the course of action.
Surrogate Decision Making with Respect to
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment
The authority of surrogate decision makers with
regard to life-sustaining treatment has been the
subject of several court decisions in recent years.
Three significant developments have been influen-
tial in this regard:
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1) There is a growing recognition of the right of an
appropriate surrogate to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment or care for an incompetent, even in the absence
of an advance directive authorizing refusal.
2) Courts are rejecting the view that forgoing the use
of sophisticated life-sustaining devices such as respira-
tors is sometimes permissible but that withholding
other procedures such as artificial feeding is never per-
missible. They seem to be moving toward acceptance
of the fact that any sort of life support may sometimes
justifiably be withheld or withdrawn.
3) Courts are showing an increasing awareness that
substituted judgment is an . . . appropriate guidance
principle for incompetents who previously were com-
petent, not for all incompetents."
These developments paved the way for numer-
ous state statutes related to the authority of a sur-
rogate to consent to a DNR order. Georgia, Illinois,
Montana, New Jersey, and New York are among
the first states to enact such legislation. Statutes
vary somewhat from state to state; however, the
general provisions are similar. Each statute pro-
vides that an appropriately authorized person may
consent to a DNR order for an adult candidate for
nonresuscitation.2 1 Each state may have slightly dif-
ferent definitions of an "appropriately authorized
individual." They also define the circumstances
under which a surrogate could authorize the
issuance of a DNR order. Below are the circum-
stances as defined in New York statutes. The lan-
guage in other state statutes varies somewhat, but
the intent is essentially the same:
1. The patient is in a terminal condition (reason-
ably expected to cause death within one year).
2. The patient is permanently unconscious.
3. Resuscitation would be medically futile.
4. Resuscitation would impose an extraordinary
burden on the patient in light of the patient's
medical condition and the expected outcome
of resuscitation on the patient.24
These statutes were followed by a proliferation
of health care proxy statutes. Like the Wisconsin
power of attorney for health care statutes, these
health care proxies are appointed by patients
before they become incapacitated. The health care
proxy is given the same authority with respect to
DNR orders as the patient would have if the
patient were capable to act. Consequently, the
agent is given "broader authority than the surro-
gate appointed pursuant to the DNR statutes who
... may only consent to a DNR order under cer-
tain circumstances." 25
Most states now allow for the appointment of a
legally authorized surrogate decision maker. This
person, called a health care agent, power of attor-
ney, proxy, surrogate, or some other title, is chosen
by the patient while capacitated. This surrogate is
authorized to make health care decisions on behalf
of the patient when the patient is no longer able to
do so, based on the previously expressed wishes of
the patient. However, if the patient has not previ-
ously designated a health care surrogate, that per-
son is not able to do so after he or she becomes
incapacitated. It then becomes necessary to petition
for a court-appointed guardian (of the person) to
consent to health care treatment.
The Authority of Guardians
Like a health care proxy, a guardian of the person
is considered to have the power to consent to med-
ical treatment for the benefit of the ward. "The
guardian does not have the authority, however, to
consent to medical care that does not serve the
ward's interest." 6 So, does a guardian have author-
ity to consent to a DNR order for a ward? To deter-
mine the answer, we need to look at the issue from
several different angles. The first issue has to do
with a distinction between previously competent
and never-competent persons.
A previously competent patient may have indi-
cated preferences regarding CPR before becoming
incapacitated. "If these ward's wishes are known, it
is considered to be in the ward's best interest that
these wishes be followed, and the guardian has the
authority to follow those wishes if they are clear."2
This is consistent with the standard of "best inter-
est." The Supreme Court in regard to the Cruzan v.
Missouri Dept. of Health case concluded that states
may require clear and convincing evidence of a
ward's previously expressed wishes before allowing
a guardian to authorize removal of artificial nutri-
tion or hydration." It then becomes an issue of
what constitutes "clear and convincing" evidence.
If the ward had not previously made expressions
related specifically to CPR, it may still be possible
for the guardian to use substituted judgment "if the
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ward's wishes can be reasonably inferred from his
or her past conduct."" The guardian should con-
sider the ward's past behavior and/or lifestyle, the
ward's history, and other contexts that may reflect
the ward's values.30 In Quinlan, the court approved
the substituted judgment test, but found it unnec-
essary because it believed that almost everyone
with the patient's prognosis would refuse treatment
if they could.3 ' Nevertheless, Quinlan's primary sig-
nificance is its affirmation of the right of a legal
guardian to refuse life-prolonging treatment
through the exercise of substituted judgment, in the
absence of a formal advance directive.
In Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, both
the Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme
Court "affirmed that an appropriate surrogate can
refuse life-sustaining treatment through an exer-
cise of substituted judgment."32 The Delaware
Supreme Court interpreted "medical supportive
measures" as including the use of respirators,
antibiotics, and feeding tubes. The court also
stated that no order requiring CPR could be writ-
ten for a patient."
A case before the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has, once again, considered the standard by which
the courts will judge the authority of a guardian to
consent to withdrawing or withholding life-sus-
taining treatment from a ward. In In the Matter of
the Guardianship and Protective Placement of
Edna M.P v. Eisenberg, the court concluded that
the guardian could not consent to removal of a
feeding tube because the ward was not in a persis-
tent vegetative state and had not provided an
advance directive regarding tube feedings. The
court held that:
[I]f that person is not in a persistent vegetative state,
this court has determined that, as a matter of law, it is
not in the best interests of the ward to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, including a feeding tube, unless
the ward has executed an advance directive or other
statement clearly indicating his or her desires."6
With its requirement that a guardian demon-
strate "by a preponderance of evidence a clear
statement of [the ward's] desires," the court seems
to be seriously limiting the use of substituted judg-
ment in such cases. Consequently, it may no
longer be viable for a guardian to call upon this
standard, unless the guardian can produce a signif-
icant amount of evidence of the ward's previous
wishes. Does this mean that a guardian will not be
able to consent to a DNR order for a ward who has
not given an advance directive and is not in a per-
sistent vegetative state?
In Edna, the supreme court held that it was not
in the ward's best interest to withdraw a feeding
tube because she was not in a persistent vegetative
state and "could, therefore, likely feel the pain and
discomfort of starving to death."" The decision
was based largely on the conclusion that the ward's
best interest (to be relatively free of pain) were bet-
ter served by maintaining the feeding tube. Given
the volumes of literature regarding the potential
negative outcomes of CPR for older people, it is
likely that a guardian could make a strong case for
not administering CPR. It would not be in the best
interest of the ward to put him or her through the
pain and discomfort of CPR. In other words, the
guardian would have to depend upon a best-inter-
est standard to consent to a DNR order.
For the patient who was never competent, sub-
stituted judgment is even less meaningful. In
Saikewicz, the court adopted the test of substituted
judgment to be applied by a probate court after an
adjudicatory hearing." This was a case involving
forgoing chemotherapy for a never-competent per-
son. The court suggested that substituted judgment
can only be exercised by the courts in such cases.
The appropriate standard for the patient who has
never been competent is the patient's best interest.40
Subsequent court rulings have suggested that a
best-interest standard be applied in cases involving
never-competent individuals. In In re Conroy, the
New Jersey Supreme Court argued convincingly
that where the patient's wishes are not or cannot be
known, the appropriate question is whether life-
support measures provide the patient with a bal-
ance of benefits over burdens.4 1
Conroy and In re Storar both acknowledge that
substituted judgment is only applicable to individ-
uals who previously were competent. Conroy pro-
poses a best-interest standard for cases in which a
decision cannot be based on the individual's previ-
ous values and preferences.42 In Storar, the New
York Supreme Court held that "the question of
what the individual would choose if competent has
no sense when applied to a lifelong incompetent." 4'
How does one determine the best interest for a
person who is incompetent? In virtually every case,
13
14 Elder's Advisor
it is suggested that persons with disabilities will
benefit from a strong presumption that their inter-
ests are essentially the same as the interests of
other people.4 As indicated earlier, when the
patient's previous wishes are known, it is pre-
sumed to be in his or her best interest to follow
those wishes. If the patient's previous wishes are
not known, or if the patient was never competent,
one would normally assume that the preservation
of life is in the patient's best interest. However,
there may be exceptions to this rule. According to
a handbook on advising older clients for
Wisconsin attorneys:
If there is no way to know what the ward would have
wanted, a guardian may still consent to the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment if the
ward is in a persistent vegetative state and the
guardian determines in good faith that withholding
treatment is in the ward's best interests."
This position is affirmed in In the Matter of
Guardianship of L. W. The court concluded:
Where . .. there is little or no evidence of a patient's
wishes, the guardian must determine what is presently
in the patient's best interest. Unlike a substituted judg-
ment, which necessarily involves considerations of the
patient's past wishes, values, feelings and beliefs, the
best interests standard focuses solely on what is cur-
rently in the patient's best interests.4 6
The court provided 12 criteria to guide
guardian's best-interest determination:
the
(1) Whether the ward ever expressed any views
regarding life-sustaining treatment.
(2) The wishes of the family.
(3) An independent medical opinion.
(4) The recommendation, if any, of a bioethics com-
mittee.
(5) The chances of physical recovery.
(6) The chances of mental recovery.
(7) The likelihood of physical, psychological, or emo-
tional injury as a result of providing or not providing
treatment.
(8) The likelihood and duration of survival without
treatment.
(9) The physical effects of prolonged treatment.
(10) The benefits of continued life with and without
treatment.
(11) The motives of those supporting withdrawal.
(12) Any other factors bearing on the best interests of
the ward.17
The court examined the interests of the state
with regard to life-sustaining treatment. These
interests, as identified in Saikewicz, include: (1)
preserving life, (2) safeguarding the integrity of the
medical profession, (3) preventing suicide, and (4)
protecting innocent third parties.4 ' The L. W. court
determined that the state's interest in preserving life
"weakens as the degree of bodily intrusion increas-
es and the chance of recovery wanes." 49 Similarly,
the Saikewicz court found that no state interest in
the continuation of life can overcome the constitu-
tional right "to decline medical treatment in a situ-
ation of incurable illness."so In L. W, the court
determined that the state's interest in protecting the
integrity of the medical profession was not impli-
cated, because the physicians supported the deci-
sion to withdraw life support." With regard to the
suggestion of suicide, the court referred to Section
154.11(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which states
specifically: "The withholding or withdrawing of
life-sustaining procedures . . . from a qualified
patient under this chapter does not, for any pur-
pose constitute suicide.""
The fourth state interest, that of protecting
innocent third parties, was also determined to be
inapplicable, as there were no third parties
involved.53 The Saikewicz court recognized that the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment was a con-
stitutional right that can only be interfered with if
the state can demonstrate a compelling interest.14
According to Frolik and Barnes, "[w]hen the state's
interests are balanced against those of the individ-
ual . . . the state almost never prevails."5 5
As noted earlier with regard to the L. W. case,
the guidelines for deciding whether or not treat-
ment is in the best interest of the ward include con-
sidering the likelihood of physical, psychological,
or emotional injury as a result of providing or not
providing treatment. This seems to be an acknowl-
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edgment that the trauma caused by treatment may
not be in the ward's best interest, if the probability
of recovery and continued life is relatively low. In
support of the decision not to require Saikewicz to
undergo chemotherapy, the court stated: "He . . .
would experience fear without the understanding
from which other patients draw strength. The
inability to anticipate and prepare for the severe
side effects of the drugs leaves room only for con-
fusion and disorientation."s"
With regard to CPR in an elderly patient, the
potential injury is significant. Most elderly people
suffer broken bones and internal organ damage as
a result of CPR. And, as discussed earlier, the like-
lihood of survival, let alone recovery, may in some
cases not be very good.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it would seem that the guardian of
the person has authority to consent to a do-not-
resuscitate order for the incompetent ward in most
circumstances within appropriate guidelines. If the
ward is a previously competent individual and had
explicitly indicated his or her wishes regarding
CPR, the guardian can and should follow those
wishes. If the ward did not provide specific infor-
mation regarding his or her wishes with respect to
CPR, the guardian may call upon a substituted
judgment standard, if the guardian can provide suf-
ficient evidence of the ward's values and prefer-
ences as expressed clearly through his or her previ-
ous lifestyle and behavior. If the ward was never
competent or if his or her previous wishes cannot
be determined, the guardian should determine,
using the criteria outlined in the L. W case, whether
or not CPR is in the best interest of the ward. These
determinations should be made in dialogue with
the physician and other health care professionals.
James Childress offers a simple lexical ordering of
decision makers for situations in which the
patient's current or previous preferences cannot be
ascertained: family (or legally authorized surro-
gate), physicians and other health professionals,
hospital committees, and the courts. The process
works like this:
The family [or guardian] can make the decision only
in consultation with the physician and other health
professionals, but the physician remains a moral agent
and should appeal to another decision-maker if he or
she believes that the family's [or guardian's] decision is
not in the patient's best interest. The court's involve-
ment may be indispensable when it is necessary to
adjudicate a conflict between the family's [or
guardian's] interests and the patient's interests.s"
Decisions regarding life-support measures,
including CPR, are very personal and profound. As
George Annas states: "No one wants a system in
which all treatment decisions for incompetents are
made by judges, or one in which they are all made
by physicians. Nor does anyone want a system
where the rights of the weakest members of our
society are not fully protected.""
Properly appointed guardians, acting in good
faith, in consultation with medical professionals, try-
ing to the extent possible to ascertain the wishes of the
ward, are in the best position to consent to treatment
for the ward, including the withholding of CPR.
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